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Brian McCaig
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Abstract
Most workers in low-income countries work for a household business or a farm. We examine 
how export opportunities induced by the 2001 U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement affect 
performance of non-farm household businesses in Vietnam. Household businesses in industries 
with greater declines in U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese exports expand revenue and are more likely 
to hire non-household members as workers. Moreover, the responses to tariff cuts differ with 
initial size of a household business. Initially small household businesses experience a 
contraction of revenue and are less likely to hold a business license in response to tariff cuts, 
while initially larger businesses account for the observed expansion of revenue within an 
industry in response to export opportunities. Our results, combined with the findings in McCaig 
and Pavcnik (2012), suggest that new export opportunities induced a reallocation of workers 
from informal household businesses to employers in the formal enterprise sector by the 
relative expansion of employment of firms in the formal sector.
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1. Introduction
The effects of international trade on firm performance, allocation of workers across 
heterogeneous employers (Levinsohn (1999), Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011)) and 
compliance of employers with labor market regulation (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Paz 
(2012), Almeida and Poole (2013)) have mainly been examined among the employers in the 
formal sector due to data constraints.1 This paints only a partial picture of how firms and labor 
markets adjust to trade reform. For example, in Vietnam in 2001 only 36% of manufacturing 
workers and 15% of workers economy-wide work for employers in the formal registered 
enterprise sector that is subject to labor market regulation. Given that household businesses 
and farms employ the majority of the population in low-income countries, it is crucial to 
understand how they respond to trade liberalization episodes, especially if one is interested in 
mechanisms of how labor reallocates in response to trade shocks (Brookings Trade Forum 2003, 
2004) and how trade affects overall employment in employers covered by labor market 
regulation.
We examine household business responses to export opportunities in a low-income 
country setting. In particular, we study the consequences of new export market opportunities 
induced by the 2001 U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) for the performance of 
household businesses in Vietnam. The existing theoretical and empirical work clearly 
establishes that not all firms within an industry are affected equally by expanded export 
opportunities. Initially larger, more productive firms expand and upgrade
1 Broadly speaking, the informal sector refers to the sector where firms/employers are not subject to labor market 
regulation or required to provide social insurance. See Section 2 for a detailed discussion and definition of 
informality in our context.
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technology/quality/productivity, while smaller firms contract and potentially exit (Melitz 
(2003), Verhoogen (2008), Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), Bustos (2011), Lileeva and Trefler 
(2010)). The findings of the existing studies are confined to larger, formal firms in 
manufacturing that usually employ 10 or more individuals and exclude household businesses. 
Smaller, household businesses are often not well represented in the conventional data sources.
The BTA and the available data provide an excellent setting to study the consequences 
of new export opportunities for household businesses. We use detailed repeated cross-sections 
and panel data on household businesses from the Vietnam Household Living Standards Surveys 
(VHLSS) to overcome this data challenge.2 Another advantage of the VHLSS data is that they 
span the period of increased export market demand induced by new export opportunities 
through the BTA in 2001. As discussed in McCaig (2011) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2012), tariff 
cuts induced by the BTA were large and plausibly exogenous from Vietnam's perspective and 
are thus well suited for rigorous empirical analysis to identify the causal effect of trade on the 
firms in the informal sector. Our research design links these policy changes to micro-level data 
on household businesses from the VHLSSs to examine the mechanisms through which access to 
export markets affect the performance of household businesses. The household business data 
allows us to examine how tariff declines affect household business revenue and the probability 
that a household hires non-family workers (i.e. outside labor), which enables us to assess how 
export opportunities affect the size of the informal sector. In our data, we cannot directly 
examine transitions of these businesses into the formal enterprise sector (see Sections 2 and 3
2 See also related work by Nataraj (2011), Brambilla, Porto, and Tarozzi (2012), and McCaig (2011).
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for details on this process). However, we can examine whether a household business holds a 
business license, which provides a direct indicator of (a step toward) formality.
As we discuss in detail in the literature review in Section 2, our empirical analysis is 
guided by predictions of recent heterogeneous firms and trade models, such as Melitz (2003), 
which suggest that exporting opportunities will differentially affect the profitability of 
heterogeneous firms, with initially better performing firms more likely to gain from export 
opportunities (and thus also be more likely to formalize in response to increased export 
opportunities). Underlying business heterogeneity also features importantly in the informality 
literature. This literature suggests that firms optimally choose whether to formalize or not, 
depending on whether the cost of operating as a formal firm exceed the cost of operating as 
informal firm. This literature predicts that initially more productive firms are more likely to 
operate in the formal market or choose to formalize (Maloney (2004), Rogers and Swinnerton 
(2004), LaPorta and Shleifer (2008), De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2013)).
We find that household businesses in industries with larger tariff cuts are expanding 
revenue and more likely to hire outside labor. Household businesses are also less likely to hold 
a household business license in response to declines in tariff cuts, although these results are 
not always statistically significant. Interestingly, in addition to the average effect of tariff 
reductions on revenue, industries with bigger tariff cuts also appear to experience reallocation 
of revenue from small to larger firms. We find that initially small household businesses 
experience a contraction of revenue with tariff cuts, while initially larger household businesses
appear to be growing relative to small household businesses.
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These results highlight the importance of looking at heterogeneous effects of tariff cuts 
across household business for interpretation of observed tariff-induced increase in revenue and 
decrease in household business license use. For example, the licensing effects appear to be 
driven by initially small firms that are contracting revenue in response to tariff cuts and might 
be moving toward the margin of closing down. Thus, declines in business license use are not 
indicative of an expanding informal sector. Instead, they are related to reallocation of activity 
away from small household businesses (which are shrinking in response to tariff cuts) toward 
larger, probably more productive, household businesses. These licensing patterns are also 
consistent with cross-sectional correlations in our data, which suggest that initially larger, and 
likely more productive business, are more likely to hold a business license, or (conditionally on 
not holding one) obtain one in the future. The evidence in this paper confirms the existing 
literature on formalization (De Mel, McKenzie, Woodruff (2013), Maloney (2004), Rogers and 
Swinnerton (2004), La Porta and Shleifer (2008)), which suggests that the initially more 
successful household businesses are more likely to transition toward formality (in our case this 
is measured by holding a business license).
Our evidence on expanding revenue and increased hiring of outside labor in industries 
with larger tariff cuts might be at first surprising given that these household businesses were 
expected to contract as predicted by Melitz (2003) style models. However, one has to be careful 
in interpreting our results. The identification of the effects of the BTA on household business 
performance is based on comparisons of household businesses in industries that received larger 
tariff cuts to those in industries with lower tariff cuts. Thus, our results suggest that export
market opportunities expand revenue and hiring of outside labor toward industries with bigger
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tariff reductions within the informal sector. However, we cannot rule out that household 
business revenue and hiring of outside labor is declining in response to export opportunities 
relative to performance of formal firms within the industry. One could examine this claim more 
directly for revenue and exit by using data that would simultaneously cover formal firms in the 
enterprise sector and household businesses, but this is a topic for future work.
Our results combined with evidence from McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) provide insights on 
the issue of how export opportunities induce reallocation of workers between household 
businesses and employers in the formal sector in low-wage countries. Evidence in McCaig and 
Pavcnik (2012), based on nationally representative labor force data from the VHLSSs that is 
representative of employment in household businesses and the enterprise sector, clearly shows 
that the share of workers working for household businesses in an industry declines in response 
to tariff cuts. Thus, overall export market opportunities are expanding employment among the 
formal enterprises more than among the household businesses. While the current paper finds 
evidence that household businesses are more likely to hire outside labor in response to 
expanded export market opportunities (perhaps because they subcontract with larger firms 
that directly export), these effects appear to be dominated by an even greater expansion of 
employment opportunities among the formal employers in industries with greater export 
opportunities. Thus it appears that expansion of formal jobs is not occurring because of an 
absolute contraction of the informal sector, but instead by a relatively greater expansion of the 
jobs in the formal sector in response to export market opportunities. This suggests that new 
export opportunities are increasing relative demand for labor in the formal sector through the
expansion of existing, larger, formal firms.
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The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we first discuss the concept of informality in 
the context of Vietnam. We subsequently place our study into the broader literature on trade 
and informality by providing a detailed survey of the existing literature. We discuss various 
definitions of informality, trade theory predictions for how export market opportunities should 
affect performance of household businesses, and the existing empirical evidence on the 
relationship between trade and informality. This literature review also summarizes McCaig and 
Pavcnik (2012) on how trade affects the allocation of labor between the formal and informal 
sectors in Vietnam. Section 3 describes the data and the BTA. Section 4 discusses 
characteristics of household businesses while Section 5 introduces our econometric 
methodology. Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 discusses the implications of our 
findings and concludes.
2. Literature Review
In this literature review we provide an overview of the link between international trade, 
informal employment, and performance of informal household enterprises. We first discuss the 
empirical definitions of informality used in the existing literature, overview the definition of 
household businesses in Vietnam, and discuss how the definition of informality based on 
household businesses relates to other definitions used in the literature. In the second part of 
the review we discuss the causal channels through which international trade could affect 
informality and the performance of household businesses and the existing evidence on the 
relationship. We conclude with a discussion of how our study will contribute to the existing
literature on trade and informality.
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2.1. Measuring Informality in Vietnam: Household Businesses
Informality is a multi-dimensional concept (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004, 2007) for 
surveys). In this project we focus on one dimension of informality, namely a distinction on 
whether a firm is a household business or an enterprise. In Vietnam all state, foreign and 
collective businesses are legally required to register as enterprises under Vietnam's Enterprise 
Law.3 However, private businesses can legally operate in three different modes: a household 
business without a license, a household business with a license, and a private enterprise.4 56Rules 
exist describing in which of the three modes the business should be operating, but many 
household businesses seem unaware of the legal requirements to register their household 
business despite almost all of them meeting the legal requirements to do so based on their 
income (Cling et al. (2012)).5,6 Thus, any private business which is not registered as an 
enterprise is, broadly speaking, considered to be a household business. This includes licensed
3 During our study period the relevant version of the Enterprise Law is the Law on Enterprises passed in 1999.
4 See Decree No. 02/2000/ND-CP and Decree No. 109/2004/ND-CP.
5 Household businesses operating without a license are not necessarily doing so to avoid detection by tax or labor 
authorities as businesses engaged in salt-making, as street vendors, or as service providers with low incomes are 
not required to register. See Decree No. 109/2004/ND-CP.
6 Various studies discuss the benefits and costs of a firm being an enterprise as opposed to a household business. 
For example, Malesky and Taussig (2009) report that enterprises, relative to household businesses, have easier 
access to export licenses, customs certificates, opportunities to bid on government contracts, the right to open 
branches and to operate outside their home district. At the same time, running an enterprise (as opposed to a 
household business) entails the registration cost and more rigorous accounting. Taussig and Hang (2004) reports 
benefits of being an enterprise (relative to household business) as greater ability to trade beyond home district, 
ability to expand, value added tax receipts, legal ability to establish branch locations, a stamp for making 
transactions more official, more predictable, law based interactions with government, ability to access equity for 
limited and joint stock companies, and greater access to government investment incentives. Costs of formalization 
include registration costs, annual registration fee, certified chief accountant, greater reporting requirements, 
potential for increased attention from local authorities, and potential for increased taxes with movement from 
lump sum to standard tax calculations. They also report that many laws governing household businesses are the 
same as those for sole proprietorships, the simplest form of a company (CIEM, Assessment of the Strengths and 
Weaknesses of the Enterprise Law: Recommendations for Amendments and Additions (Draft), 2004, p. 62). The 
information on the costs of registering as a private enterprise in Vietnam is summarized by the World Bank's Doing 
Business Survey.
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and unlicensed household businesses. In Vietnam these are often referred to as formal and 
informal household businesses respectively. Our project focuses on household businesses and 
relies on data that includes household businesses with and without a license.7 Information on 
the costs of obtaining a business license is not readily available, but costs do not seem to be a 
significant barrier. Only a small percentage of household businesses without a license consider 
the lack of license being related to expense or complicated nature of the licensing process 
(World Bank (2010)) and World Bank (2009) reports that few households experienced difficulty 
registering a household business.8 Among households businesses without a license, the vast 
majority reports they are not registered either because it is not compulsory or because they 
don't know if they need to register (World Bank (2010)). Household businesses that hold a 
license report the main advantage of having a license as less corruption, followed by better 
access to market places, and easier loan access (World Bank (2010)). One possible explanation 
for not obtaining a business license is that a requirement of being licensed is to pay taxes. 
However, Cling et al. (2012) find that some unlicensed businesses report paying taxes and most 
household businesses also make additional payments to public officials. Therefore avoiding 
taxes by being unlicensed may not lead to an overall decrease in payments to government
7 Most of the studies using the 1993 and 1998 Vietnam Living Standards Surveys and the 2002 and 2004 Vietnam 
Household Living Standards Surveys simply refer to the businesses included in the datasets as non-farm household 
enterprises (NFHE). In 1993 Vietnam did not distinguish between household businesses and private enterprises. 
This began sometime later, but the distinction did exist by the 1998 survey. Neither the 2002 nor 2004 survey 
distinguishes between household businesses and private enterprises. This is probably why researchers use the 
term non-farm household enterprise since it incorporates both types of businesses covered in the business 
modules. However, data from the 2006 VHLSS, which distinguishes between household businesses and private 
enterprises, suggest that even in 2006, a very small share of private businesses, 2.2%, are private enterprises.
8 World Bank (2010) is based on a survey of licensed and unlicensed household businesses operating in Hanoi and 
Ho Chi Minh City, while World Bank (2009) is based on data from the 2008 VHLSS. A web site aimed at the business 
community (http://www.vietnam-briefing.com/news/vietnams-taxes-business.html/) suggests that the fee varies 
by monthly income of the business from 50,000 to 1,000,000 dong per year, but the site does not list the original 
source for this information nor the relevant time frame.
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agencies. Despite imperfect adherence to the law obtaining a business license is considered as 
a first move toward formality (Cling et al. (2010, 2012)).
Several earlier studies have focused on this definition of household businesses in 
Vietnam (see for example Vijverberg et al. (2006)). An alternative definition was used in two 
studies by Cling et al. (2010, 2012) on the informal sector in Vietnam.9 Following the official ILO 
definitions, these two studies define the informal sector "as all private unincorporated 
enterprises that produce at least some of their goods and services for sale or barter, are not 
registered (no business license) and are engaged in non-agricultural activities," (Cling et al.
(2010), p. 6). Hence, this definition corresponds to unlicensed household businesses. This study 
further defines informal employment "as employment with no social security (social 
insurance)" (Cling et al. (2010), p. 6).
Our definition of informality based on household businesses versus firms in the 
enterprise sector falls somewhere between the two definitions above. It is broader than the 
concept of the informal sector but likely to be more restrictive than the concept of informal 
employment, which also includes workers in the enterprise sector who do not receive social 
insurance.10 Given the nature of our data, we can perfectly replicate the informal sector
9 Cling et al. (2010) was commissioned by the ILO.
10 We are still trying to pin down exactly the legal requirements for providing social insurance to employees within 
the household business sector and the enterprise sector. There are overlapping laws since this is covered both in 
the Labour Code and the Law on Social Insurance. Compliance is a separate issue. Since we do not focus on social 
insurance in this paper, this does not affect the definition of household businesses, but we would like to be familiar 
with the legal details.
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definition used in Cling et al. (2010, 2012), but we cannot do so for the informal employment 
definition.11
While the focus on household businesses does not enable us to capture the dimension 
of informality related to workers employed by formal enterprises that do not receive social 
insurance, the focus on household businesses is informative for several reasons. First, the 
performance of household businesses and the allocation of labor between household 
businesses and other employers (i.e., enterprises) are usually not observed in conventional 
individual- and firm-level data (McCaig and Pavcnik (2012), Pages (2012)). As a result, our study 
provides a rare opportunity to examine how household businesses respond to expanded export 
opportunities. Second, the distinction between employment in household businesses and other 
employers (i.e., enterprises) has potentially important implications for worker earnings. For 
example, in Vietnam, workers in household businesses earn 7 to 14 percent less than 
observationally equivalent workers in the same industry, province, and occupation working in 
the enterprise sector (McCaig and Pavcnik (2012)). Third, the focus on household businesses is 
important for the design of informed policy because in low-income countries household 
businesses and farms account for a vast majority of employment (Woodruff (2012), Nataraj
(2011), Hsieh and Klenow (2009, 2011), Banerjee and Duflo (2007)). Fourth, the longitudinal 
dimension of our data enables us to study the dynamics of household businesses and their 
adjustment to trade.
Beginning in 2007 the GSO began conducting a nationally representative labor force survey. The questions were 
designed to be consistent with the concepts of the informal sector and informal employment as defined by the ILO 
and these surveys were the basis of analysis for Cling et al. (2010).
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2.2. International trade, informality, and the performance of household businesses
The literature on the effects of international trade on informal employment is small 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)). Most of this literature focuses on the definition of informality 
based on compliance with payroll taxes among the formal firms in urban areas of middle- 
income countries in Latin America such as Brazil and Colombia (see, for example, Menezes-Filho 
and Muendler (2011), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Co§ar, Guner and Tybout (2010), and Paz
(2012)). Furthermore, most of this literature examines the effect of increased import 
competition (measured by unilateral domestic import-tariff reductions) on the probability that 
a worker works in the informal sector (see Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Menezes-Filho and 
Muendler (2011), Co§ar et al. (2010), and Paz (2012)). The studies find that lower import tariffs 
are not robustly associated with the probability that a worker works in the informal sector 
(Menezes-Filho and Muendler (2011), Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003), Paz (2012)).
To our knowledge only two studies have examined the response of informality to new 
export market opportunities. Paz (2012) finds that compliance with payroll taxation increases 
with new export opportunities in Brazil. The study most closely related to the current project is 
McCaig and Pavcnik (2012), which examines how trade affects the allocation of employment 
between informal household businesses and more formal employers using nationally 
representative worker-level data from Vietnam. They identify the effects of trade on 
performance of household businesses by relying on a plausibly exogenous trade policy change 
to improve our understanding of the causal effects of export opportunities on informality. As
discussed in McCaig (2011) and McCaig and Pavcnik (2012), tariff cuts induced by the BTA were
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large and plausibly exogenous from Vietnam's perspective and are thus well suited for rigorous 
empirical analysis to identify the causal effect of trade on the informal sector.
Methodologically, McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) follow the recent literature on labor 
markets in developing countries to relate various outcomes of interest to differential exposure 
to trade policy changes across industries (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)). Their findings suggest 
that the probability that a worker works in a household business (as opposed to a more formal 
employer) has declined in response to export opportunities, so that the aggregate share of 
informal sector employment has been shrinking in Vietnam in response to the BTA. These 
effects are particularly pronounced among the younger cohorts of workers and in provinces 
that are more integrated into international markets (as measured by a province's proximity to a 
major seaport).
The evidence in McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) suggests that export opportunities expand 
the share of workers working for formal establishments. However, the above analysis does not 
inform us about the mechanisms through which export opportunities affect workers transition 
to formal employers. Are individuals obtaining formal jobs because the most successful 
informal household businesses are expanding and transitioning to the registered, formal sector 
in response to export opportunities? Or are individuals transitioning to the formal sector 
because new export opportunities are increasing demand for labor in the formal sector through 
expansion of existing, larger, formal firms? The current paper in part contributes to this topic by 
examining the responses of household business to export opportunities.
Household businesses likely differ from enterprises in many dimensions, including that
they tend to have lower labor productivity than enterprises (see McCaig and Pavcnik (2012)).
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Let us for now focus on this dimension of heterogeneity between household businesses and 
enterprises. The heterogeneous firms and trade literature, such as Melitz (2003), predicts that 
new exporting opportunities will reallocate employment and market share from less efficient to 
more efficient firms, thus leading to a relative contraction of household businesses. In Melitz 
(2003) firms differ in underlying performance and face a fixed cost of accessing export markets. 
In this setting, only some firms export, and these tend to be the initially more productive firms 
that are profitable enough to cover the fixed cost of exporting.
The model generates several predictions for how increased access to an export market 
(due to a decline in a foreign tariff) affects firm survival, output, and employment. First, an 
increase in market access will lead to an increase in industry demand. However, only initially 
better firms benefit from this expansion because they are the ones profitable enough to cover 
the fixed cost of exporting. Thus, sales and employment in the initially better firms expand due 
to increased export demand. This expansion occurs by increased output and employment in 
existing exporters and entry of firms into the export market (i.e. new exporters). Second, the 
expansion of better firms due to new exporting opportunities increases industry-wide wages 
and the intensity of competition (Melitz (2003), Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)). Consequently, 
some less efficient firms that only serve the domestic market observe a contraction in output 
and employment. In fact, the most inefficient firms no longer earn sufficient profits to cover 
fixed costs of production, so that increased export opportunities lead the least efficient firms to 
exit the industry.
These models create clear predictions that within an industry, trade will expand the
employment in initially bigger, better performing firms and contract employment in initially less
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efficient firms. Recent papers using firm-level data show that increased export market access is 
associated with a reallocation of market share from less to more productive firms as well as 
increases in wage inequality, quality upgrading and technology upgrading in formal urban 
manufacturing in middle-income countries (Verhoogen (2008), lacovone and Javorcik (2008), 
Bustos (2011)). These benefits are particularly pronounced for initially more productive, larger 
firms. However, these studies do not provide any guidance on the effects of exporting on 
household businesses because household businesses are not observed in their setting. If this 
channel matters, so that initially smaller, informal firms contract or even exit in this process, 
while initially larger, more formal firms expand, exporting could contribute to an increase in 
formal employment through this channel.
The above discussion suggests that it is unlikely that household businesses will be 
expanding subsequent to new exporting opportunities. The model would predict that export 
market opportunities should be related to contraction of household business revenue, 
contraction of employment in household businesses, and increased exit of household 
businesses. Moreover, one would expect contracting businesses to be less likely to hold a 
business license.
However, there are several caveats of applying this framework to household businesses. 
First, a large number of household businesses do not employ outside labor, instead relying on 
labor supplied by household members. For example, in Vietnam, only about 10 percent of 
household businesses hire outside labor. Schoar (2010) and Woodruff (2007) suggest that 
household businesses mainly employ household labor in most less developed countries, 
including Mexico, Colombia, and Sri Lanka. As such, Melitz-style models, which assume
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perfectly competitive labor markets and labor mobility, may not accurately depict the 
opportunity cost of labor for these businesses. If the wage rate is not an accurate reflection of 
the opportunity cost of labor for the business the predictions of exit from these models may 
not apply in this context. Furthermore, Schoar (2010) and Woodruff (2007) suggest that the 
existing literature finds that very few household businesses create new jobs in the economy 
through expansion of employment beyond household members.
Second, household businesses may operate as subcontractors for larger, more formal 
businesses. In Hanoi and Ho Chi Ming City, over 90% of output from household businesses is 
sold either directly to households or to another household business or small enterprise (World 
Bank (2010)), although sales to larger enterprises might account for about a quarter of output 
in manufacturing household businesses (World Bank (2010)).12 About 10% of household 
businesses report subcontracting relationships in 2002 (Kokko and Sjoholm (2005)). While these 
figures suggest subcontracting might not play a large role for non-farm household businesses 
during our sample period, some household businesses may indirectly benefit from increased 
demand for products produced by large firms that benefit directly from the export 
opportunities.
Third, household businesses may not directly compete with products produced by 
larger, more formal firms. Hence, the expansion of larger, more formal firms in response to 
increased foreign market access may not increase product competition faced by household 
businesses. In fact, only 1% of household businesses report exporting and they view other non­
state private businesses as their main source of competition (Kokko and Sjoholm (2005)).
12 This information is based on household businesses operating in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City as covered by the 
2007 and 2009 Household Business and Informal Sector surveys conducted by the GSO.
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While household businesses might not compete directly in the product market with 
firms in the enterprise sector, they might be indirectly affected by the expansion of these firms 
through the general equilibrium effects of trade on labor demand (McCaig and Pavcnik (2012)). 
In Melitz (2003) less productive firms exit because these firms are not sufficiently profitable to 
cover higher wages. Likewise, to the extent that increased export market opportunities increase 
wages, Lucas (1978) predicts a decline in self-employment and an increase in employment in 
businesses run by more able entrepreneurs.
Given that the expanded labor market opportunities increased provincial wages in 
Vietnam in provinces more exposed to new export opportunities (McCaig (2011)), the 
opportunity cost of working as a self-employed for a household business might have increased, 
thus potentially leading to declines in household business employment, increased exit of 
household businesses, and expansion of employment in the enterprise sector.
The above discussion of the theoretical predictions on how expanded export 
opportunities will affect performance of household businesses suggests that how informal 
household businesses response to export opportunities is an empirical question.
3. Data
In this section we introduce the two household surveys and tariff data that we rely on 
for our study. We describe the scope of the surveys, our procedure for matching businesses 
across the two surveys, and the key business variables used in the analysis. Lastly we introduce
the tariff data.
International Trade and Household Businesses: Evidence from Vietnam 17
We use two nationally representative household surveys, the 2002 and 2004 Vietnam 
Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS), which were conducted by the General Statistics 
Office (GSO) of Vietnam. The surveys were conducted throughout 2002 and 2004 and feature a 
one-year recall period. Each survey contains modules related to household demographics, 
education, health, employment, income generating activities, including household businesses, 
and expenditures. These surveys are nationally representative, cover rural and urban areas, and 
contain individual- and household-level panel datasets that allow one to study employment 
transitions and better control for unobserved household business heterogeneity. Of the 74,350 
and 45,928 households surveyed in 2002 and 2004 respectively, we can track 22,415 
households and their respective members between the two surveys.13,14 Most importantly for 
our purposes, the surveys contain a detailed module on private businesses run by the 
household. These include unlicensed household businesses, licensed household businesses, and 
private enterprises.13 45 Most of these businesses are not covered in the more widely available 
firm-level data. This module is the key focus of the current study.
The business module collects information on whether a household operates a business, 
the industry in which the business operates, the number of months it operated during the past
13 The decline in the sample size between the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs is primarily due to a reduction in the number 
of households surveyed within an enumeration area. The 2002 VHLSS surveyed households within 3,001 
enumeration areas averaging approximately 25 households per enumeration area. The 2004 VHLSS surveyed 3,062 
enumeration areas, but only 15 households per enumeration area.
14 The VHLSSs feature a rotating panel by enumeration area. Thus not all enumerations areas surveyed in 2002 
were intended to be resurveyed in 2004. This accounts for why the number of panel households is noticeably 
lower than the total number of households surveyed in the 2004 VHLSS, as only about half of the enumeration 
areas surveyed in 2004 were surveyed in 2002.
15 The business modules do not distinguish whether a business run by the household is a household business or a 
private enterprise. In 2004 we can use information on whether the business manager/owner reports working in 
the private sector (as opposed to the household business sector) to gauge the prevalence of businesses that are 
private enterprises. Only 1.5 percent of panel businesses could be considered private enterprises by this definition. 
As a result, we do not explore this margin further.
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12 months, the wage bill, revenue and expenditures, whether the business has a license, and 
who is the most knowledgeable person (hereafter referred to as the manager).
Although the household surveys were not directly designed to track businesses over 
time, we can do so taking advantage of information on the business that is not likely to change 
in a short period of time. In particular, we use information on the industry of the business and 
the manager of the business to match businesses between the 2002 and 2004 surveys. 
Unfortunately, the 2004 VHLSS did not report the manager of the business and thus before we 
can match businesses over time we begin by predicting the manager of the business by 
matching information reported about the business with information reported in the labor 
module about workers within the household. A full description of the process is available in the 
Data Appendix. We test the procedure using the 2006 VHLSS which contained the same 
business information as the 2004 VHLSS but also reported the manager and find that our 
procedure correctly predicts the manager for 92.4 percent of businesses in the 2006 VHLSS.16 
Thus we feel very confident about our ability to accurately predict the manager for businesses 
reported in the 2004 VHLSS. With information on the manager and industry of operation in 
both 2002 and 2004 we construct a business panel by first matching businesses over time 
within a household by industry and manager. Subsequently, among remaining businesses we 
match by either manager or industry within the household. Full details of the procedure can be 
found in the Data Appendix. We match 3,821 businesses by industry and manager, 1,272 
businesses by industry only, and 1,038 businesses by manager only leading to a panel of 6,131
16 We did not use the 2002 VHLSS for testing the algorithm because it did not collect as much information about an 
individual's secondary job as the 2004 and 2006 VHLSSs did. Since many businesses are run as a second job testing 
the algorithm using the 2006 VHLSS is more appropriate.
International Trade and Household Businesses: Evidence from Vietnam 19
businesses. This represents 84.4 percent of all possible businesses that could be matched over 
time within panel households.
We link the business and manager data to detailed information on U.S. tariffs on 
Vietnamese exports in a given time period based on the business' industry affiliation. This 
detailed tariff data has been collected and previously used by McCaig (2011). McCaig (2011) 
documents the advantage of studying the relationship between market access and employment 
in the context of the BTA. The tariff cuts are across all industries, are large (on average a 21.1 
percentage point decline across all traded industries and 30.3 percentage points within 
manufacturing) and vary widely across industries (the standard deviation of the tariff reduction 
is 17.6 percentage points).17 Another advantage of the BTA is that the concern about the 
political economy of protection and the endogeneity of tariff changes are less severe because 
tariff changes occurred by the U.S. moving Vietnam from the Column 2 Tariff schedule to 
Normal Trade Relations (or Most Favored Nation status). McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) show that 
these declines in tariffs were associated with increased industry exports from Vietnam to the 
United States and in overall Vietnamese exports. The BTA thus provides an excellent 
opportunity to study the causal link between exporting opportunities and the performance of 
household businesses.
4. Household business characteristics
Household businesses employ the majority of workers in low-income countries, but 
substantially less is known about their performance relative to the performance of formal firms
17 These averages are across 2-digit ISIC revision 3 industries, which are the basis of the industry codes used in the 
2002 and 2004 VHLSSs.
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usually captured in conventional firm-level data sources. We therefore examine basic 
household business characteristics, how they relate to household business performance, and 
compare these patterns to the patterns observed for more formal firms in the existing 
literature and to the patterns noted by the existing literature on the topic reviewed above in 
less developed countries and in Vietnam.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the household business data. 37% of households 
own a business, with almost 80% of the households owning only one business, and 19% of 
households owning two businesses. Households with more than two businesses are rare. About 
70% of businesses operate in services (i.e. tertiary activities), while manufacturing accounts for 
the vast majority of the remaining household businesses. Within manufacturing, household 
businesses are most common in food and beverage production, wood processing, clothing and 
apparel, furniture manufacturing, and the textile industry. 20% of household businesses report 
having a business license and 11 percent hire outside labor. Household businesses employ on 
average only 1.7 employees and 0.3 paid workers.18 The low number of employees per 
household business is consistent with employment patterns in informal businesses from other 
less developed countries surveyed in Woodruff (2007) and Schoar (2010).
A large literature on firms operating in the formal sector documents a high degree of 
heterogeneity in underlying performance (see Melitz and Redding (2013) for a survey). These 
studies do not capture household businesses. Vietnamese household businesses tend to be 
smaller (as measured by revenue or employment) and have lower labor productivity than firms 
in the enterprise sector (McCaig and Pavcnik (2012)). Household businesses also exhibit a large
18 The information on number of employed individuals is only available in 2004.
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degree of heterogeneity in performance. Figure 1 plots the density of log revenues for 
household businesses in 2002 and 2004 and shows large differences among household 
businesses. This heterogeneity in performance motivates the empirical strategy we employ in 
Section 5, where we explore differential effects of export market opportunities on performance 
by household business size.
In addition to heterogeneity in revenue, household businesses also exhibit substantial 
heterogeneity in holding a business license and hiring workers, two business characteristics 
associated with more formal interactions with government officials and labor markets. Table 2 
divides household businesses in 2002 into three size bins, based on whether their revenue lies 
in the bottom, middle, or the upper third of the industry revenue distribution in 2002. Larger 
household businesses are more likely to hold a business license (37% of large businesses hold a 
business license, while 6% of small businesses do) and hire workers from outside of the 
household (23% of large businesses hire outside labor versus only 3% of small household 
businesses). Figures 2 and 3 show nonparametrically that the probability that a household 
business holds a business license or hires outside labor increases with revenue. Low-revenue 
businesses are very unlikely to hold a business license or hire outside labor, but the probability 
of holding a license (or hire outside labor) increases rapidly with household business size. 
Initially more successful household businesses that do not have a license are also more likely to 
obtain a business license in the future. Figure 4 plots the relationship between obtaining a 
business license between 2002 and 2004 and revenue in 2002 for household businesses 
without a business license in 2002 and shows the positive relationship that is particularly steep 
for large businesses. Similarly, Figure 5 plots the probability of hiring outside labor in 2004
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versus initial revenue for businesses that did not hire outside labor in 2002. The relationship is 
strongly positive, except among the few businesses with initially high revenues.19 In sum, 
initially more successful household businesses display or eventually adapt more of the 
characteristics associated with firms in the formal enterprise sector.
While we focus on a different dimension of "formalization", namely whether a business 
holds a business license, our findings of a positive correlation between business performance 
and the level of formalization are consistent with evidence in World Bank (2010). Their study 
relies on data that distinguishes between licensed (i.e. formal) and unlicensed (i.e. informal) 
household businesses based on an alternative survey of Vietnamese household businesses.20 
They find that formal household businesses tend to be bigger (in terms of revenue and 
employment size) and less likely to exit than informal household businesses. Furthermore, 
informal household businesses that become formal tend to be bigger and more productive than 
informal household businesses that remain informal.
The household business sector also appears very dynamic. Table 3 suggests large 
degrees of entry and exit.21 42 percent of firms exited between 2002 and 2004 and 42 percent 
of businesses operating in 2004 were new since 2002. These rates of entry and exit exceed the 
rates reported for formal firms (Roberts and Tybout (1996)). High rates of entry and exit of 
Vietnamese household businesses are also consistent with evidence in Vijverberg et al. (2006) 
and World Bank (2010). Firm exit is highly correlated with firm performance. Exit rates are
19 Almost all household businesses at such high level of revenue hire outside labor (see Figure 3), so the observed 
decline could simply reflect a low number of observations and measurement error at high levels of revenue.
20 The Household Business and Informal Sector Survey (HB&IS) used in the study is only available for 2007 and 
2009 and only covers Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.
21 Our procedure for defining panel businesses (described in the data appendix) is likely overly cautious. This 
implies that we somewhat overestimate entry and exit.
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substantially higher for smaller firms than larger firms. Figure 6 plots the propensity that a firm 
exits against household business revenue. Like previous literature on formal firms we find that 
the probability of exit declines with firm revenue. Low-revenue firms face a high probability of 
exit, which diminishes with household business size. There is a slight increase in the probability 
of exit for the largest firms (followed by a decline).22 Our evidence is consistent with World 
Bank (2010), which finds that initially better performing household businesses (as measured by 
initial revenue, value added, profit, and employment) and older businesses are less likely to 
exit.
Market selection forces would suggest that only the better household businesses should 
survive over time, yielding a positive relationship between household business age and revenue 
(Hsieh and Klenow (2011)). Figure 7 plots log revenue in 2004 versus the age of the business.23 
We find a positive relationship between revenue and age only among the recently created 
businesses: household businesses that have operated for five years tend to have higher 
revenue than younger ones. However, the revenue age profile of businesses older than five 
years is fairly flat. This latter pattern is similar to patterns observed among formal firms in 
countries such as India and Mexico (Hsieh and Klenow (2011)). Overall, this finding suggests 
that maybe the forces of market selection might be more important for the recently created 
household businesses, but play a smaller role among older businesses.
5. Empirical Methodology
22 Very few household businesses have revenue that exceeds 106 million dong so those results might be affected by 
measurement error.
23 The average business has operated for 7.7 years. Only 10% of household businesses are more than 20 years old, 
so we confine the analysis to household businesses that have operated for at most 20 years.
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We examine the effect of declines in U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese exports on the 
performance of Vietnamese household businesses by linking industry-level tariffs to micro-level 
data on household businesses in Vietnam that spans the period of the U.S.-Vietnam BTA. In 
particular, we relate various outcomes of interest y of household business i in industry j at time 
t to industry tariffs in the following framework:
y1]t= a+ Ptariff]t+ 5XIfl+ + pP+ h + £yt (i)
where y is the outcome of interest, tariffjt is the tariff in industry j at time t, and Xijt is a vector of 
household business characteristics. These include an indicator for whether a household 
business is in an urban area, the gender, age, and education of the manager, an indicator for 
whether a manager is an ethnic minority, household size, and variables denoting gender and 
age composition of household members.24 The regression also includes industry, province, and 
time fixed effects. We examine the following household business performance measures: 
household business revenue, the probability that a business hires outside labor, the probability 
that a business has a business license (a first step toward formality), and the probability that a 
household business exits.
The above framework abstracts from heterogeneity in responses of household
businesses to export opportunities. The models in Section 2 suggest that the tariff cuts should
affect firms differentially depending on their initial performance. We also expand the baseline
specification to consider whether there are differential effects of new export opportunities (as
measured by U.S. tariff cuts) on household business performance measures depending on their
initial size (or profitability), as Melitz (2003) would predict. We focus on the panel household
24 These include variables that indicate the number of family members ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and 
older by gender.
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businesses and augment the specification in (1) to allow for the effect of tariffs to differ across 
initially small, medium, and large household businesses in a method similar to Bustos (2011):
3 3
yijt =  a + D i  f t  +  P t a r if f j t  + X  F  D i  t a r if f j t  + 5 X ijt + 4  +  Y i +  £ yt (2)
r=2 r=2
where D i  is an indicator for whether a firm is in the bottom third (small), middle (medium), or 
upper third (large) of the 2002 firm revenue distribution.25 This specification includes 
household business fixed effects yi and thus controls for any time-invariant household business 
characteristics. In addition, the specification controls for potential differential trends across 
small, medium, and large household businesses by inclusion of interactions of year indicator 
with the indicators for the initial household business size. Industry tariffs are based on the 
tariffs in the industry in which the business operated in 2002. The interaction terms allow for 
differential effects within an industry and correspondingly 0 1 and f i3 measure the effect of 
tariffs on medium and large businesses, respectively, relative to small businesses. Thus, a 
negative value for f i3, for example, implies a greater increase in the outcome of interest for 
large businesses relative to small businesses in response to the U.S. tariff reductions. The 
overall effect for medium and large businesses would then be 0  + 0 . All standard errors are 
clustered at the initial industry level to control for general forms of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation.
6. Results
25 These indicators are based on the position of a household business in the industry's revenue distribution in 
2002. We also construct similar indicators based on initial expenses in 2002.
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We estimate each specification separately for traded industries, manufacturing 
industries, and all industries. In regressions involving all industries businesses in non-traded 
industries are assigned a tariff of 0 in both periods. In Section 6.1 we report results of 
estimating equation (1) using the repeated cross sections of businesses and panel businesses. In 
Section 6.2 we present results of estimates of equation (2) using a panel of businesses and 
allowing for heterogeneous effects of export market opportunities across businesses of 
differing initial sizes.
6.1 Effects of the BTA on household business performance
As discussed in Section 2, theory provides ambiguous predictions on whether and how 
household businesses would be affected by the declines in U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese exports. 
The specifications that estimate equation (1) and do not allow for differential effects by 
household business size are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 displays results based on estimating equation (1) for repeated cross sections for 
ln revenue, an indicator for hiring outside labor, and an indicator for having a license as a 
dependent variable. The table only reports the estimates and standard errors for the coefficient 
on tariffs, the key coefficient of interest. The results suggest that falling U.S. tariffs are 
associated with a decrease in revenue for household businesses in traded and manufacturing 
industries, but these effects are very imprecisely estimated and are not statistically different 
from zero. Moreover, declines in tariffs do not affect the probability a household business hires 
outside labor in traded and manufacturing industries. Interestingly, declines in tariffs are
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associated with an increase in the probability of hiring outside labor in the sample that includes 
businesses in all industries.
As noted in the literature review, while household businesses are considered to operate 
in the informal sector, some of them hold a business license, which can be viewed as a first step 
by an unregistered household business toward formality (Cling et al. (2010, 2012)). Household 
businesses obtain a business license by registering with the district authorities and the 
literature review discusses the costs and benefits of holding the license. The information on the 
cost of obtaining a business license is not readily available, but the cost is likely not a significant 
barrier. In our sample approximately 20 percent of household businesses hold a license (Table 
1) and more successful businesses are more likely to hold a business license (Figure 2). 
Interestingly, results in Table 4 suggest that declines in U.S. tariffs are associated with a 
decrease in the probability that a business holds a business license (albeit the effect for traded 
industries and manufacturing are not statistically significant).
In Table 5 we report results for the same outcomes but restrict the sample to panel 
businesses (i.e., those businesses that we observe in both 2002 and 2004). The focus on panel 
businesses reduces the sample size. The smaller sample size reflects a smaller sample of 
households that were surveyed in both 2002 and 2004 (as noted in the data section, about 30 
and 49 percent of the household in the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs respectively were part of the 
panel) and entry and exit of businesses.26 The panel sample enables us to examine changes in
26 While the sample of panel business is smaller, panel businesses have similar baseline (2002) characteristics as 
the businesses in the repeated cross section. Panel businesses have somewhat higher revenue and a slightly higher 
probability of holding a business license. This is expected given that panel businesses are businesses that survive 
both periods and a large literature has documented (including this paper in Figure 6) that larger businesses are less 
likely to exit. Moreover, larger businesses are more likely to hold a business license (as noted in Figure 2). 
Importantly, summary statistics suggest that household businesses operated by panel households have similar
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performance of household businesses over time and estimate an augmented specification of (1) 
that controls for time-invariant household business characteristics, which potentially bias the 
cross-sectional results in Table 4.
Table 5 reports results from estimating equation (1) with OLS and from augmenting the 
specification in (1) with business fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant 
household business characteristics. Beginning with revenue, the results based on panel 
businesses suggest that the U.S. tariff cuts induced an increase in revenue. In terms of 
magnitude, the average tariff cut within manufacturing, 30.3 percentage points, is associated 
with a 9 percent increase in revenue based on the fixed effects estimate in column 2. Thus, the 
size of the informal sector in Vietnam (as measured by revenue of household businesses) 
appears to increase in industries experiencing larger declines in U.S. tariffs on Vietnamese 
exports. We also find a consistent positive effect of the U.S. tariff cuts on the probability of 
hiring outside labor in businesses within traded, manufacturing, and all industries. Based upon 
the business fixed effects estimation for manufacturing in column 2, the average tariff 
reduction in manufacturing brings about a 3 percentage point increase in the probability that a 
household business hires outside labor.
The bottom of Table 5 presents results for having a business license. As is the case in 
Table 4, the U.S. tariff cuts are associated with a decrease in the probability of having a license, 
but the effects are not statistically significant in all specifications. The magnitude of the OLS and 
fixed effects coefficients on tariffs in Table 5 is somewhat greater than in the respective
observable characteristics to those reported for all businesses in Table 1 in 2002. This confirms that slight 
differences in revenue and the probability of holding a license are related to the focus on surviving business in a 
panel.
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columns in Table 4. The magnitudes of the estimates are suggestive of an economically 
meaningful association between tariff cuts and business licenses. For example, fixed effects 
estimate reported in column (2) for manufacturing industries implies that the average tariff 
reduction in manufacturing induced a 2 percentage point reduction in the probability of having 
a license. Though this might sound relatively small, about 20 percent of businesses had a 
business license in 2002 (Table 1) so the implied effect represents a 10 percent reduction for all 
industries and 16 percent reduction in manufacturing (where only 12 percent of businesses had 
a license in 2002).
The household-business panel data enable us to examine business survival. We create 
an indicator for whether a household business exits between 2004 and 2002 and estimate 
equation (1) for all businesses run by panel households in 2002 where the industry fixed effects 
have been removed and the change in tariff is based upon the industry of operation in 2002.
We present the results in Table 6. On average, within traded industries there is little 
relationship between the size of U.S. tariff cuts and the probability of exit. Across 
manufacturing industries and across all industries U.S. tariff cuts are associated with an 
increased probability of exit, but the result is imprecisely estimated within manufacturing 
industries.
The heterogeneous firms and trade models discussed in Section 2 would predict that if 
household businesses are less productive than formal firms, they should contract, hire less 
labor, and potentially exit with increased export market opportunities. Likewise, contracting 
businesses would have less incentive to obtain a business license. We do in fact find evidence in
some specifications that larger tariff cuts are associated with declines in the propensity for a
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business to hold a business license. One could interpret this finding as suggesting that export 
opportunities have increased informality (as defined by not holding a business license) among 
household businesses in Vietnam. However, given that the propensity to hold a business license 
strongly increases with household business revenue (Figure 2) and that conditional on not 
having a license, the propensity to have a business license in 2004 increases with revenue 
(Figure 4), this decline potentially reflects declining revenue for some household businesses.
We explore heterogeneity in responses of revenue and household business licensing to tariff 
cuts further in the next section.
Our evidence on revenue and hiring of outside labor based on panel businesses suggest 
that household businesses in industries with larger tariff cuts are expanding revenue and more 
likely to hire outside labor. This might at first be surprising given that these household 
businesses were expected to contract. However, one has to be careful in interpreting our 
results. The identification of the effects of the BTA on household business performance is based 
on comparisons of household businesses in industries that received large tariff cuts to those in 
industries with small tariff cuts. Thus, our results suggest that increased export market 
opportunities expand revenue and hiring of outside labor toward industries with bigger tariff 
cuts within the informal sector. However, we cannot rule out that household business revenue 
and hiring of outside labor is declining in response to export opportunities relative to the 
performance of formal firms within the industry. One could examine this claim more directly for 
revenue and exit as outcomes by using data that would simultaneously cover formal firms in 
the enterprise sector and household businesses, but this is a topic for future work.
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Our results combined with evidence from McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) provide insights on 
the issue of how export opportunities induce the reallocation of workers between household 
businesses and employers in the formal sector. Evidence in McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) based 
on labor force data from the VHLSSs, which is representative of employment in household 
businesses and the enterprise sector, clearly shows that the share of workers working for 
household businesses in an industry declines in response to tariff cuts. Thus, for the case of 
labor, export market opportunities are expanding employment among the formal enterprises 
more than among the household businesses. While we find evidence that household businesses 
are more likely to hire outside labor in response to expanded export market opportunities 
(perhaps because they subcontract with larger firms that directly export), these effects appear 
to be dominated by an even greater expansion of employment opportunities among the formal 
employers in industries with greater export opportunities.
Finally, the above analysis does not consider heterogeneity in responses to export 
opportunities among household businesses. Yet Figure 1 and Table 2 suggest that household 
businesses differ drastically in their initial performance. Increased export opportunities could, 
for example, negatively impact small household businesses, but lead to relative expansion of 
larger household businesses. In our analysis so far, which relies on equation (1), these two 
effects could attenuate each other, lowering the coefficient on tariffs. We turn to differential 
effects of tariffs on household businesses depending on their initial size next.
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6.2 Heterogeneous effects of the BTA on household business performance
As discussed in Section 2, existing theory and empirical studies among formal firms 
suggest that the impact of the U.S. tariff cuts might have differential effects on businesses 
based on observable differences in the size of the business. Household businesses tend to be 
substantially smaller and less productive than firms in the formal enterprise sector, so they are 
expected to contract relative to the formal firms. However, in light of large degree of 
heterogeneity in initial performance of household businesses noted in Figure 1 and Table 2, we 
next examine whether there are heterogeneous effects of tariff declines across household 
businesses of differing initial sizes within industries.
We use three different specifications based on heterogeneity in initial size as in Bustos 
(2011). Within an industry we divide firms into three equal sized bins of small, medium, and 
large firms based on initial revenue and separately based on initial expenses. As both values are 
likely to be reported with error and thus bias the coefficients involving the size dummies 
towards 0, it is valuable to check our results to both size definitions. Our third specification uses 
the expense based size bins as instrumental variables for the revenue based size bins. The 
expense based size variables are highly correlated with revenue based size variables, so the 
instrumental variable specification does not suffer from weak instrument concerns. If the 
measurement error in both series is not perfectly correlated then this will help to reduce the 
bias. Importantly, using the expense based size bins and the instrumental variable approach 
helps to break the mechanical negative correlation introduced between initial revenue and 
growth in revenue due to measurement error. As a result, this is our preferred specification and 
most of the discussion below focuses on the results based on this specification.
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We find strong evidence of differential responses in revenue as medium and large 
household businesses experienced faster revenue growth than small businesses in high tariff 
cut industries. We display the results in Table 7. As in previous tables, we report the results for 
traded industries, manufacturing industries, and all industries. The tariffs are based on the 
initial industry of operation, as is the sample inclusion into the three industry samples. Across 
traded and manufacturing industries we consistently find statistically significant evidence of 
heterogeneous responses in revenue to the U.S. tariff reductions. Small businesses experienced 
a greater decline in revenue in industries with larger tariff cuts, although these estimates are 
not always statistically significant (instrumental variable results reported in the bottom panel 
are our preferred specification). Medium sized and large businesses experienced faster revenue 
growth in response to the tariff reductions than initially small businesses within their industry. 
As predicted by previous discussion of measurement error, the instrumental variable estimates 
presented in the bottom panel are consistently larger in magnitude than the OLS estimates with 
size based on initial revenue or expenses. For manufacturing businesses the instrumental 
variable estimates of the coefficient on tariff interactions with medium and small reported in 
column 2 of the bottom panel suggest that small businesses experienced a decrease in revenue 
of 39 percent in response to the average tariff reduction whereas medium and large businesses 
experienced an increase in revenue of 9 and 15 percent respectively.27 Finally, the magnitude of 
the coefficients is larger in traded and manufacturing industries, which are more directly 
impacted by trade than in the all industry sample that also includes household businesses in
27 While tariffs have statistically differential effects on medium and large household businesses relative to small 
ones, the overall effect of tariffs on revenue of medium and large household businesses in some specifications is 
not statistically significantly different from zero. It is statistically different from zero for large businesses in our 
preferred IV specification.
International Trade and Household Businesses: Evidence from Vietnam 34
non-traded industries. A large existing literature has found evidence of importance of firm 
heterogeneity in responses of firms in the formal sector to export market opportunities (Melitz 
and Redding (2013)). Our evidence suggests that heterogeneity in responses to export market 
opportunities plays some role even among the household businesses in the informal sector. So, 
the increase in revenue in industries with bigger tariff cuts found in the previous section 
appears to stem from the reallocation of revenue from small to larger firms within an industry. 
Initially small household businesses are contracting revenue with tariff cuts, while initially larger 
household business appear to be growing relative to small household businesses.
Table 8 presents the results from estimating equation (2) for an indicator for hiring 
outside labor. The majority of the coefficients are statistically insignificant, suggesting no 
heterogeneity in responses to tariff cuts in terms of hiring outside labor across household 
businesses of different size, although the overall effect is statistically different than 0 for 
medium businesses. Thus, initially medium sized businesses are more likely to hire outside 
labor in industries that experienced large tariff reductions whereas there is no discernible 
overall effect on small or large businesses. Hence, it is initially medium sized businesses that are 
primarily responsible for the average effect documented in Table 5. These results could in part 
reflect the data constraints we face. An indicator for whether a household business hires 
outside labor is clearly a crude measure of the extent of household business engagement in 
labor market. For example, it could be that larger businesses, which are more likely to hire 
outside labor than small businesses to begin with (see Table 2 and Figure 3), expand revenue by 
offering more hours of work to existing employees or hiring an additional worker. This would
imply no change in propensity to hire outside labor. In order to examine these issues further,
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we would ideally use more detailed information on the number of employees (both household 
members and outside labor) in a household business employs and the information on hours 
worked by employees. Unfortunately, we do not have data to examine these claims in the 
household business survey directly. In unreported regressions, we have estimated equation (2) 
using the log(1+labor expenditure) and the ratio of labor expenditure to revenue as an outcome 
variable and find some suggestive evidence that large firms in fact spend more on labor 
expenses (or expanding labor expenditures proportionally with revenue) with tariff cuts. 
However, these results are neither statistically significant nor robust across all specifications.
Table 9 displays the results for household business having a business license. We 
observe evidence of heterogeneous responses to tariff cuts. Small businesses are consistently 
less likely to have a license in response to the U.S. tariff cuts. The effects are less strong among 
medium and large businesses, where the coefficients on tariffs suggest that these businesses 
are more likely to hold a business license than small firms in response to tariff cuts. The 
differences for medium and large businesses, relative to small businesses, are not statistically 
significant, but the implied overall magnitudes suggest potentially non-negligible effects. For 
example, among small businesses the IV results for manufacturing in column 2 of the bottom 
panel suggest the average tariff cut decreased the probability of a small business having a 
license by 4.8 percentage points. The probability only decreased by 2.2 percentage points for 
large businesses and by 1 percentage point for medium businesses.
These results, combined with the evidence on heterogeneity in revenue responses to 
tariff cuts between initially small and large household businesses, highlight the importance of
looking at heterogeneous effects of tariff cuts across household business for interpreting the
International Trade and Household Businesses: Evidence from Vietnam 36
observed tariff-induced increase in revenue and decrease in household business license use 
noted in the previous section. The licensing effects appear to be driven by initially small firms 
that are contracting in response to tariff cuts and might be moving toward the margin of closing 
down. Thus, declines in business license use are not indicative of an expanding informal sector. 
Instead, the revenue effects suggest that there is likely a reallocation of activity away from 
small household business, which are shrinking in response to tariff cuts, toward larger, probably 
more productive, household businesses.
Finally, we explore whether initial business size induced differential exit rates in 
response to the tariff reductions by estimating a version of equation (2) where the right hand 
side is differenced over time with the change in tariff being based on the initial industry of 
operation for the business. We report the results in Table 10a. For traded and manufacturing 
industries we consistently find that large businesses are more likely to exit in response to tariff 
reductions than small businesses and mixed evidence for medium businesses. However, the 
results are not statistically significant in any specification and the implied magnitudes in 
differential exit rates are relatively small in comparison to the overall rates of exit reported by 
business size in Table 2. Theory by Melitz (2003) suggests that impacts on exit probabilities 
should be seen mostly among the smallest household businesses. The exit of the smallest firms 
would be driven by the general equilibrium effects of raising wages, which would cause the 
least productive business cease to exist. In fact, Figure 2 suggests that exit is particularly 
pronounced among the firms with the lowest revenue, then declines, and then slightly 
increases for the firms with the highest revenue. As discussed in the data section, our sample 
includes household businesses that are registered as private enterprises. While we cannot
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identify these businesses directly, the discussion in the data section suggests they likely account 
for at most 1.5 percent of our sample.28 Thus, without measurement error in the data, the exit 
of most successful businesses noted in Figure 2 should not reflect a move into formality. 
Nonetheless, measurement error is a possibility and we therefore examine whether exit is 
more pronounced for very small and very large initial businesses.
We replicate the analysis in Table 10a, but distinguish between household businesses 
that are in the bottom 10 percent of the industry size distribution (small), middle 80 percent of 
size distribution (middle), and in the top 10 percent of the size distribution (large). As in Table 
10a, the results presented in Table 10b do not find any statistically significant evidence of 
differential exit for the smallest household businesses. We do find an increased probability of 
exit for the largest household businesses in manufacturing. However, these results are not 
robust to traded sample and sample that includes all industries. Furthermore, as described in 
the data appendix, the procedure for matching businesses over time is cautious. This has the 
benefit of reducing error due to mismatched businesses in panel regressions of revenue, hiring 
outside labor, and hiving a business license, but the drawback is a potential increase in 
measurement error in defining entry and exit. The measurement error issue might be 
particularly pronounced in the tails of the size distributions, where the number of observations 
is substantially smaller. Hence, overall, we view evidence on heterogeneous effects of exit in 
Table 10b as non-robust and inconclusive.
One possible explanation for the lack of differential effect on exit is that exit is driven by 
a general equilibrium increase in the real wage, which particularly reduces the profitability of
28 The 2006 VHLSS survey distinguishes between unregistered household businesses and private enterprises and 
suggests that only 2.2% of the businesses are private enterprises.
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the least productive (smaller) firms. If the real wage is increasing approximately uniformly 
across industries, then we would not expect to see the probability of exit across industries to be 
related to differential changes in tariffs. Instead, we'd expect to see a strong aggregate 
relationship between initial revenue and exit, which we document in Section 4. McCaig and 
Pavcnik (2012) document that among workers moving from the household business sector to 
the enterprise sector most of them are unskilled laborers and often also change industries at 
the same time. Thus, the expansion of exporting firms in response to the BTA tariff reductions 
may be raising the opportunity cost of working for a household business across all industries. 
Indeed, McCaig (2011) documents increases in average wages for unskilled workers in 
geographic areas of Vietnam for which employment was more concentrated in large tariff cut 
industries.
7. Discussion of results and conclusion
Using nationally representative surveys of household businesses in Vietnam, we 
document large differences in revenue across household businesses in Vietnam and find that 
initially larger household businesses are more likely to hire outside (i.e. non-household 
member) labor, hold a business license, and survive. This underlying heterogeneity matters for 
how household businesses respond to expanded export market opportunities induced by the 
U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement. Our results suggest that household businesses in 
industries with larger tariff cuts are expanding revenue and more likely to hire outside labor.
We also find some evidence that household businesses are less likely to hold a household 
business license in response to declines in tariff cuts, although these results are not always
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statistically significant. Interestingly, in addition to the average effect of tariff reductions on 
revenue, industries with bigger tariff cuts also appear to experience reallocation of revenue 
from small to larger firms. We find that initially small household businesses are contracting 
revenue with tariff cuts, while initially larger household businesses appear to be growing 
relative to small household businesses.
These results highlight the importance of looking at heterogeneous effects of tariff cuts 
across household businesses for interpretation of the observed tariff-induced increase in 
revenue and decrease in household business license use. For example, the licensing effects 
appear to be driven by initially small firms that are further contracting revenue in response to 
tariff cuts and might be moving toward the margin of closing down. Thus, declines in business 
license use are not indicative of an expanding informal sector. Instead, they are related to a 
reallocation of activity away from small household businesses (which are shrinking in response 
to tariff cuts) toward larger, probably more productive, household businesses. These licensing 
patters are consistent with cross-sectional correlations in our data, which show that initially 
larger are more likely to hold a business license, or (conditionally on not holding one) obtain 
one in the future. These patterns also confirm the existing literature on formalization (De Mel, 
McKenzie, Woodruff (2013), Maloney (2004), Rogers and Swinnerton (2004), La Porta and 
Shleifer (2008)), which suggests that the initially more successful household businesses are 
more likely to transition toward formality (in our case this is measured by holding a business 
license).
Our evidence on expanding revenue and increased hiring of outside labor in industries
with larger tariff cuts might be at first surprising given that Melitz style models would predict
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that these household businesses should contract. However, one has to be careful in 
interpreting our results. The identification of the effects of the BTA on household business 
performance is based on comparisons of performance of household business in industries that 
received larger tariff cuts to those in industries with lower tariff cuts. Thus, our results suggest 
that export market opportunities expand revenue and hiring of outside labor toward industries 
with bigger tariff within the informal sector. However, we cannot rule out that household 
business revenue and hiring of outside labor is declining in response to export opportunities 
relative to formal firms within the industry. One could examine this claim more directly for 
revenue and exit by using data that would simultaneously cover formal firms in the enterprise 
sector and household businesses, but this is a topic for future work.
However, our results combined with evidence from McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) provide 
insights on the issue of how export opportunities induce the reallocation of workers between 
household businesses and employers in the formal sector in low-wage countries. McCaig and 
Pavcnik (2012) relied on worker-level data and found that expanded export opportunities led to 
the reallocation of workers from household businesses to employers in the enterprise sector 
and that these effects were particularly pronounced for younger workers and for workers in 
provinces proximate to major seaports. While the evidence in the current paper suggests that 
household businesses in industries with larger tariff cuts are more likely to hire outside labor 
and increase revenue, the evidence from McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) suggest that new export 
opportunities increased employment opportunities in the formal sector proportionally more. 
Overall, this evidence is in line with La Porta and Shleifer (2008) who show that the level of
informality in an economy generally declines with economic development through the growth
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of existing formal firms and the decline of informal firms rather than formalization of firms in 
the informal sector. 29
Export-market opportunities lead to the reallocation of workers in Vietnam from the 
informal to the formal sector. One might wonder whether results from Vietnam generalize to 
other low-income countries with a large share of informal labor. While further analysis is 
needed, Vietnam might have been particularly well positioned for rather fast reallocation of 
labor from informal to formal sector in response to export opportunities. In McCaig and Pavcnik 
(2013), we find that Vietnam has higher level of education, lower administrative trade costs, a 
more undervalued exchange rate, and more flexible labor markets (as measured by World 
Bank's Doing Business Survey) than countries at a similar level of development as Vietnam in 
the early 1990s. These factors tend to facilitate the reallocation of labor toward more 
productive activities (McMillan and Rodrik (2011)).
Overall, the analysis in the current paper, combined with McCaig and Pavcnik (2012), 
illustrates how one can use existing household surveys that include a labor force survey or a 
household business module to study the informal sector. As long as these surveys are 
nationally representative and include some basic information on the type of establishment that 
employs a worker associated with informality (such as ownership type or establishment 
employment size (for countries where businesses above a certain size need to formally 
register)), this information can in principle be used to study the allocation of labor across formal 
and informal sector in other low-income country settings.
29 McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) note that worker switching from working for a household business to working for an 
employer in the formal sector often coincides with a change in industry affiliation. In addition, entrants into the 
labor force are more likely to begin working for a formal employer, while those that exit the labor force are more 
likely to have previously worked for a household business. All these facts are inconsistent with the aggregate 
share of informal workers declining due to formalization of previously unregistered household businesses.
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Our findings suggest that economy-wide and in manufacturing the share of workers that 
work for employers that are required to comply with labor market legislation has increased 
with export market opportunities. This reallocation is potentially important because 
observationally equivalent workers that work for employers in the formal sector (relative to 
household businesses) report on average higher per capita income, higher expenditures per 
capita, higher wages, and access to more benefits and social insurance (McCaig and Pavcnik 
(2012)).
Much of the existing evidence on trade and informality has focused on a definition of 
informality that is based on compliance with social insurance among the employers in the 
formal sector, which are by law required to comply with social insurance. Our definition of 
informality is based on employment in household businesses, which are not legally required to 
provide compulsory social insurance. The focus on employment in the informal sector 
complements the existing literature and discussion of informal employment within the formal 
sector in several ways. First, household businesses might choose to operate in the informal 
sector (and not become a registered private enterprise) in order to not be subject to social 
insurance or labor market regulation. Second, employment in household businesses is not 
covered by compulsory social insurance, so movement of workers toward formal employers, at 
least in principle, provides workers with greater access to social insurance.30 Third, suppose 
that export opportunities reallocate workers from the informal sector to the formal sector (as is 
the case in our setting), but the incidence of compliance with social insurance within the formal
30 McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) document that workers that work in household businesses earn lower wages and 
report lower per capita household income and per capital expenditures than observationally equivalent workers in 
the formal sector and are less likely to receive any benefits than workers that work for firms in the formal 
enterprise sector.
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sector employers does not change. A study that would only focus on compliance with social 
insurance in the formal sector would miss that more workers are covered by compulsory social 
insurance due to the worker movements from the informal to the formal sector. The current 
study and McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) suggest that this reallocation of workers between the 
informal and formal sectors is an important margin of labor market adjustment to increased 
export market opportunities.
While our analysis sheds new light on how exporting opportunities affect the 
performance of household businesses in the informal sector, whether informality defined as 
informal employment (i.e., noncompliance with social insurance among the formal firms) in the 
formal sector was affected with increased export opportunities remains an open question in 
Vietnam. Our analysis cannot assess whether increased export market opportunities have 
increased compliance with labor market legislation among the employers in the formal sector 
(i.e., formal employment) because the data does not include information on whether the 
employers that need to comply with labor market legislation do so.
We can rely on trade theory based on heterogeneous firms, such as Melitz (2003), for 
guidance on this relationship. To the extent that better performing firms are more likely to 
provide better working conditions and comply with labor market legislation, trade theory would 
predict that declines in employment in the informal sector would also be associated with a 
decline in informal employment within the formal sector as workers reallocate toward better 
performing firms. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any study that examines both of these 
margins of informality directly. For example, Paz (2012) only focuses on workers covered by 
labor market legislation in the formal sector and finds increases in compliance with payroll
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taxation among the formal Brazilian firms in response to increased export market
. . 31 32opportunities. '
In order to examine the patterns of co-movement of employment in household 
businesses and informal employment within the formal sector, one would need to gather 
additional data. For example, direct verification of this relationship would require data that, like 
the VHLSSs, survey workers in the formal and informal sectors and also ask workers whether 
they receive benefits such as social insurance from their employers. Indeed, more recent 
versions of the VHLSS have begun to gather such information. For example, the 2010 VHLSS 
directly asked employed workers if they signed a payroll book, were entitled to paid leave and 
holidays, and, most importantly, if they were entitled to social insurance.
An additional complementary change in data collection would directly ask the 
household businesses whether they made social insurance contributions on behalf of their 
employees. For example, in the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs household businesses are asked to 
report their labor expenses. These expenses include salaries, wages, social insurance, health 
insurance, and trade union expenses. Unfortunately all of these labor expenses are grouped in 
one expense category. Simply separating out these expenses into separate categories would 
provide information directly from the businesses as to whether their workers were receiving 
social insurance payments. Alternatively, one could include a question directly asking the 
businesses whether their (non-household member) workers have a contract and whether they 312
31 The results on the relationship between increased exposure to international trade and compliance with payroll 
taxation in middle-income countries through the import channel are more mixed (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003),
Paz (2012)).
32 Self-employed in household businesses are not covered by any social insurance and health insurance coverage 
and thus the self-employed in household businesses are almost by definition both in the informal sector and in 
informal employment. McCaig and Pavcnik (2012) show that the share of self-employed also declines in industries 
with greater exposure to export markets.
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are provided with social insurance, instead of the incurred expenses. These additional questions 
for the household businesses would impose minimal additional survey costs yet provide 
valuable information on these questions by being added to existing, nationally representative 
household surveys.
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Data Appendix
In this appendix we describe in detail two data preparation steps. First we describe how 
we predict a manager for all businesses in the 2004 VHLSS. Unlike the 2002 VHLSS, respondents 
in 2004 were not asked to identify the most knowledgeable individual for the business 
(hereafter referred to as the manager for brevity). Knowing the manager of the business in 
2004 has three advantages: (1) in the employment module the individual reports whether they 
were self-employed in an enterprise or self-employed in a household business and thus we can 
use information from the employment module to identify whether a business is a household 
business or a private enterprise; (2) in the employment module the individual also reports how 
long they have been doing the job and thus we can infer a possible year of start for the 
business; and (3) it provides additional information for the business which can be used to help 
create a panel at the business level. To test the accuracy of the manager prediction algorithm 
we also run it for the 2006 VHLSS which contains the same individual and business information 
that we use for the 2004 VHLSS. The algorithm correctly predicts the manager for 91.2% of 
businesses in the 2006 VHLSS.
Second we explain how we match businesses between the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs. The 
surveys were not designed to directly create a panel of businesses however we use a 
combination of information on the manager and the industry of operation of the business to 
match them over time within a panel household. In total we match 6,131 businesses out of a 
maximum possible number of matches of 7,261.
Predicting the manager for businesses in the 2004 VHLSS
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In this section we provide a detailed description of the data available in the employment 
modules and business modules of the 2004 VHLSS which can be used for matching individuals 
with businesses, the algorithm used for matching, a summary of how the matches were made, 
and the percentage of successful predictions from using the same algorithm on data from the 
2006 VHLSS.
We combine data from the employment and business modules of the 2004 VHLSS which 
can be matched. In particular, from the employment module we identify individuals that 
reported being self-employed in a household business for either their primary or secondary job 
during the past year. For these jobs we use information on the industry, the number of months 
worked during the past years, the number of days per month usually worked, and the number 
of years the individual has been doing the job. From the business module we use information 
on the industry, the number of months operating during the past year, the average number of 
days per month operating, and the year the business started.33
In Table A1 we provide a summary of the matches by the step within the manager 
prediction algorithm at which the match was made. The table is organized sequentially such 
that the first step of the algorithm was to identify the manager for businesses in which only one 
household member reported being self-employed in the industry of the business and then only 
businesses without a predicted manager would proceed to the next row. The first step of the 
algorithm matches an individual as the manager for the business for 70.5% of all businesses in 
the 2004 VHLSS. The corresponding rate of success using the 2006 VHLSS is 99.3%. Thus, for a 
large share of businesses we have a very high degree of confidence in our predicted manager.
33 The year the business started is only available for about 1/5th of the sample since this question was not asked of 
all businesses, but instead was part of an extra module on businesses that only 1/5th of households were asked.
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Next, we identified a manager for any remaining businesses when there was only one 
household member for whom the number of years in the job, the number of months worked in 
the past year, and the number of days per month matched. And so on down the rows of the 
table.34 In sum, the algorithm correctly identified the manager for 92.4% of businesses in the 
2006 VHLSS. Thus, our manager prediction algorithm is doing a very good job of identifying the 
manager of the business.35
Matching businesses between the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs
Not all businesses run by a panel household should be matched over time. For example, 
any household that reports running a different number of businesses across the two years has 
experienced net entry or exit of businesses and thus at least one business within the household 
should not be matched. Thus, for any given the household the maximum number of matched 
businesses is the minimum of the number of businesses run in either year. Table A2 
summarizes the number of businesses run by panel households in 2002 and 2004. There are
Note that the percentage of successfully identified managers in the 2006 VHLSS for "Only household member 
with matching months and days per month" is likely an underestimate of the rate for the 2004 VHLSS. This is 
because only about 1/5th of businesses in the 2004 VHLSS have information on the year when the business started 
whereas all businesses in the 2006 VHLSS have this information. Thus some 2004 businesses for which the year 
was not reported, but the number of years, months, and days all matched would only be matched in the row "Only 
household member with matching months and days per month". Indeed, in the 2006 VHLSS 11.3% of businesses 
are matched in the step "Only household member with matching years, months, and days per month" as 
compared to only 1.8% in the 2004 VHLSS and 3.2% of 2006 VHLSS businesses were matched to a manager in the 
step "Only household member with matching months and days per month" as compared to 9.5% in the 2004
VHLSS.
35 Our algorithm does not predict a manager for 595 out of 21,458 (2.8 percent) businesses. This could be due to 
the business being managed by an individual as their third job, which our algorithm currently does not include, or 
due to measurement error either in the industry of the business or the industry of the job.
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22,415 panel households in our dataset. A little over half of the households did not operate a 
business in 2002 or 2004. The number of businesses that can potentially be matched is 7261.36
The most valuable information that we have for matching businesses over time is the 
manager and the industry of operation. We begin by matching businesses within a household 
by industry-manager and find 3,821 matches. These represent businesses that have a unique 
industry-manager combination within the household in both years and the combination existed 
in both years (e.g., the same manager operated a business in the same industry in both years 
and did not manage any other businesses in the same industry in either year). Note that this 
will include instances in which a manager closed one business and opened a new business in 
the same industry, but 97.2 percent or predicted managers in 2004 report doing the job for at 
least 2 years, suggesting that most of these businesses are indeed continuing businesses.
Next, among the remaining businesses we relax the matching criteria to be (1) matched 
just by manager, which allows for industry switching and (2) matched just by industry, which 
allows for the manager within the household to change. Table A.3 summarizes the outcomes 
from all three steps for matching businesses.
36 This is derived by summing over min(i,j)*aij- where i represents the number of businesses run by the household in 
2002, j is the number of businesses run by the household in 2004, and ay is the number of households operating i 
businesses in 2002 and j businesses in 2004.
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Figure 1 - Density of ln revenue for 2002 and 2004
Notes: All values are expressed in 2004 prices. The sample includes all businesses in the 2002 and 2004
cross sections.
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Figure 2 -  Probability that a business holds a business license versus revenue 
Notes: All values are expressed in 2004 prices. The sample includes all businesses in the 2002 cross
section.
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Real revenue (thousands dong)
Figure 3 -  Probability that a business hires outside labor versus revenue 
Notes: All values are expressed in 2004 prices. The sample includes all businesses in the 2002 and 2004
cross sections which are pooled together.
International Trade and Household Businesses: Evidence from Vietnam 57
Figure 4 -  Probability that a business obtains a license between 2002 and 2004 versus revenue in 2002 
Notes: All values are expressed in 2004 prices. The sample includes all panel businesses that did not
have a license in 2002.
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Figure 5 -  Probability that a business hires outside labor in 2004 versus revenue in 2002 for businesses
that did not hire labor in 2002
Notes: All values are expressed in 2004 prices. The sample includes all panel businesses that did not hire
outside labor in 2002.
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Figure 6 -  Probability that a business exits between 2002 and 2004 versus revenue in 2002 
Notes: All values are expressed in 2004 prices. The sample includes all businesses operated by panel
households in 2002.
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Mean Revenue 1----------1 Confidential Interval
Figure 7 -  Mean revenue in 2004 by age of business 
Notes: All values are expressed in 2004 prices. The sample includes all 2004 businesses operated by 
households that were asked the extended business module of the 2004 VHLSS, which is approximately
1/5th of all households in the cross section.
Table 1: Summary statistics on household businesses
2002 2004
Panel A: Summary of households operating businesses
Number of households 74,350 45,928
Number of households operating businesses 27,824 17,293
1 business 21,674 13,684
2 businesses 5,376 3,120
3 businesses 671 422
4 businesses 103 67
Number of businesses 34,851 21,458
Panel B: Summary of business characteristics
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Indicator for primary industry 0.015 0.121 0.009 0.092
Indicator for secondary industry 0.280 0.449 0.284 0.451
Indicator for tertiary industry 0.699 0.459 0.707 0.455
Indicator for urban 0.334 0.471 0.334 0.472
Household size 4.751 1.761 4.682 1.717
By demographics:
Females age 0-14 0.674 0.837 0.619 0.802
Males age 0-14 0.717 0.808 0.652 0.774
Females age 15-60 1.554 0.907 1.564 0.893
Males age 15-60 1.474 0.937 1.509 0.933
Females age 61 and older 0.196 0.405 0.202 0.409
Males age 61 and older 0.137 0.347 0.135 0.344
Business manager characteristics
Female 0.571 0.495 0.583 0.493
Head of household 0.449 0.497 0.427 0.495
Age 15-24 0.083 0.276 0.072 0.259
Age 25-34 0.279 0.449 0.236 0.424
Age 35-44 0.345 0.475 0.354 0.478
Age 45-54 0.184 0.387 0.221 0.415
Age 55-64 0.069 0.253 0.073 0.261
Age 65 and older 0.038 0.192 0.040 0.195
Ethnic minority 0.070 0.256 0.078 0.268
Business characteristics
Indicator for business license 0.195 0.396 0.216 0.412
Indicator for hiring outside labor 0.108 0.310 0.091 0.287
Revenue 18855 122903 30231 283587
Expenses 9755 81175 20008 277671
Share of expenses on labor 0.032 0.118 0.028 0.113
Number of workers 1.67 2.74
Number of paid workers 0.32 2.19
Age of business (years) 7.69 6.90
Note: Authors's calculations based on the VHLSSs. Information on number of workers, paid workers, and 
age of business is not available in the 2002 VHLSS.
Table 2: Summary statistics of key household business characteristics based on size in 2002
All businesses Small businesses Medium businesses Large businesses
Variable Mean # obs Mean # obs Mean # obs Mean # obs
Revenue 18855 34851 2625 11769 8112 11592 46316 11490
Indicator for having a license 0.19 34742 0.06 11666 0.15 11592 0.37 11484
Indicator for hiring outside labour 0.11 33545 0.03 11008 0.06 11226 0.23 11311
Labor expenses 1102.3 33545 14.5 11008 108.1 11226 3147.7 11311
Labor expenses conditional on being 
positive
10231 3614 514 310 1751 693 13636 2611
Notes: Revenue and labor expenses are reported in 000s of dong in 2004 prices. Businesses are defined as small, medium, and large 
based on whether their revenue lies in the bottom, middle, or the upper third of the revenue distribution within their industry in
2002.
Table 3: Summary of exit, entry and survival
Year Entry Surviving Exiting Total
Number of household businesses
2002
2004
n.a. 6130 4497 10627 
4384 6131 n.a. 10515
Share of household businesses
2002
2004
n.a. 0.58 0.42 1.00 
0.42 0.58 n.a. 1.00
Table 4: Regression results from using all businesses in the repeated cross sections
(1) (2) (3)
Manufacturing
Traded industries industries All industries
Dependent variable: ln(revenue)
Industry tariff 0.244 0.265 -0.0480
(0.190) (0.205) (0.202)
Observations 18,029 14,451 55,114
R-squared 0.336 0.356 0.294
Dependent variable: indicator for hiring outside labor
Industry tariff -0.0122 -0.0133 -0.0537*
(0.0218) (0.0201) (0.0312)
Observations 18,252 14,768 54,407
R-squared 0.193 0.215 0.121
Dependent variable: indicator for business license
Industry tariff 0.0184 0.0238 0.0668***
(0.0182) (0.0165) (0.0241)
Observations 18,502 14,905 55,604
R-squared 0.132 0.146 0.115
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The industry tariff is based on the contemporary industry of the 
business as is the sample selection by industry. All regressions also include year 
fixed effects, industry fixed effects, province fixed effects and controls for 
household business characteristics. These include an indicator for whether a 
household business is in an urban area, gender, age, and education of the manager, 
an indicator for whether a manager is an ethnic minority, household size, and 
variables denoting gender and age composition of household members. The latter 
include variables that indicate the number of family members ages 0-14, ages 15­
60, and ages 61 and older by gender.
Table 5: Regression results from using panel businesses
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation Manufacturing
method Traded industries industries All industries
Dependent variable: In(revenue)
OLS Industry tariff -0.240* -0.227* -0.107
(0.124) (0.110) (0.0844)
Fixed Industry tariff -0.281** -0.300* -0.0266
effects (0.130) (0.149) (0.129)
Dependent variable: indicator for hiring outside labor
OLS Industry tariff -0.140*** -0.122** -0.141***
(0.0455) (0.0449) (0.0301)
Fixed Industry tariff -0.0957*** -0.0993*** -0.0998***
effects (0.0294) (0.0318) (0.0226)
Dependent variable: indicator for business license
OLS Industry tariff 0.0544 0.0597 0.0964***
(0.0323) (0.0395) (0.0293)
Fixed Industry tariff 0.0588 0.0682 0.131**
effects (0.0439) (0.0491) (0.0516)
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. The industry tariff is based on the contemporary industry of the business as is the sample 
selection by industry. All regressions also include year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, 
province fixed effects and controls for household business characteristics. These include an 
indicator for whether a household business is in an urban area, gender, age, and education of the 
manager, an indicator for whether a manager is an ethnic minority, household size, and variables 
denoting gender and age composition of household members. The latter include variables that 
indicate the number of family members ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and older by gender.
Table 6: Exit regression results for all businesses operated by panel households in 2002
(1)
Traded industries
(2)
Manufacturing
industries
(3)
All industries
Change in
Dependent variable: indicator for exit
-0.00187 -0.183 -0.122**
industry tariff (0.112) (0.118) (0.0551)
Observations 3,617 2,846 10,588
R-squared 0.070 0.088 0.054
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The change in industry tariff is based on the 2002 industry of 
the business as is the sample selection by industry. All regressions also include 
province fixed effects and controls for household business characteristics. These 
include an indicator for whether a household business is in an urban area, gender, 
age, and education of the manager, an indicator for whether a manager is an ethnic 
minority, household size, and variables denoting gender and age composition of 
household members. The latter include variables that indicate the number of family 
members ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and older by gender.
Table 7: Revenue heterogeneity regression results
Dependent variable is ln(revenue)
(1)
Traded industries
(2)
Manufacturing
industries
(3)
All industries
Fixed effects ; size base on initial revenue
Industry tariff 0.395 0.418 0.0821
(0.294) (0.364) (0.208)
Industry tariff * medium -0.551 -0.631* -0.0875
(0.341) (0.346) (0.315)
Industry tariff * large -0.952** -1.015** -0.241
(0.353) (0.382) (0.308)
Observations 3,740 3,071 12,148
R-squared 0.893 0.895 0.876
Fixed effects; size base on initial expenses
Industry tariff 0.437 0.601 -0.00250
(0.420) (0.475) (0.311)
Industry tariff * medium -0.666 -0.897** -0.0721
(0.403) (0.387) (0.400)
Industry tariff * large -1.103** -1.324*** -0.170
(0.422) (0.416) (0.446)
Observations 3,703 3,050 11,839
R-squared 0.890 0.893 0.870
Fixed effects IV; size base on initial revenue
Industry tariff 0.787** 0.833* 0.230
(0.362) (0.431) (0.236)
Industry tariff * medium -1.106** -1.205** -0.284
(0.506) (0.526) (0.465)
Industry tariff * large -1.437*** -1.539*** -0.450
(0.362) (0.400) (0.293)
Observations 3,662 3,012 11,774
R-squared 0.166 0.155 0.186
F-statistic: of excluded instruments
Endogenous regressor
Industry tariff * medium 56.89 41.53 30.42
Industry tariff * large 183.0 137.7 72.71
2004*medium 234.0 1358 393.4
2004*large 107.4 231.7 39.49
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
The industry tariff is based on the 2002 industry of the business as is the sample selection by industry. 
All regressions also include year fixed effects, year effects interacted with household business size 
indicator, industry fixed effects, province fixed effects, and controls for household business 
characteristics. These include an indicator for w hether a household business is in an urban area, gender, 
age, and education of the manager, an indicator for w hether a m anager is an ethnic minority, household 
size, and variables denoting gender and age com position of household members. The latter include 
variables that indicate the num ber of fam ily m em bers ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and older by 
gender.
Table 8: Hiring outside labor heterogeneity regression results
Dependent variable is an indicator for hiring outside labor
(1)
Traded industries
(2)
Manufacturing
industries
(3)
All industries
Fixed effects; size based on initial revenue
Industry tariff -0.0291 -0.0511* -0.0430
(0.0406) (0.0291) (0.0412)
Industry tariff * medium -0.124 -0.0909 -0.0637
(0.101) (0.102) (0.0629)
Industry tariff * large -0.0408 -0.0149 -0.0928*
(0.0448) (0.0395) (0.0512)
Observations 3,769 3,107 12,042
R-squared 0.814 0.824 0.763
Fixed effects; size based on initial expenses
Industry tariff -0.0632 -0.0742 -0.0765
(0.0791) (0.0781) (0.0706)
Industry tariff * medium -0.0658 -0.0818 -0.0304
(0.0933) (0.0949) (0.0722)
Industry tariff * large -0.000197 0.0422 -0.0450
(0.107) (0.0926) (0.0809)
Observations 3,750 3,096 11,887
R-squared 0.813 0.823 0.762
Fixed effects IV; size based on initial revenue
Industry tariff -0.0331 -0.0459 -0.0492
(0.0874) (0.0828) (0.0744)
Industry tariff * medium -0.135 -0.166 -0.0592
(0.137) (0.135) (0.109)
Industry tariff * large -0.000199 0.0542 -0.0785
(0.0957) (0.0792) (0.0771)
Observations 3,708 3,056 11,822
R-squared 0.046 0.049 0.031
Endogenous regressor
F-statistic of excluded instruments
Industry tariff * medium 60.61 52.42 40.03
Industry tariff * large 177.8 130.8 72.43
2004*medium 235.4 1235 386.5
2004*large 156.9 247.9 47.07
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The industry tariff is based on the 2002 industry of the business as is the sample selection by industry. 
All regressions also include year fixed effects, year effects interacted with household business size 
indicator, industry fixed effects, province fixed effects and controls for household business 
characteristics. These include an indicator for w hether a household business is in an urban area, gender, 
age, and education of the manager, an indicator for w hether a m anager is an ethnic minority, household 
size, and variables denoting gender and age com position of household members. The latter include 
variables that indicate the num ber of fam ily m em bers ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and older by 
gender.
Table 9: Business license heterogeneity regression results
Dependent variable is an indicator for having a business license
(1)
Traded industries
(2)
Manufacturing
industries
(3)
All industries
Fixed effects; size based on initial revenue
Industry tariff 0.1000* 0.0778 0.148***
(0.0533) (0.0528) (0.0537)
Industry tariff * medium 0.00646 0.0539 -0.00762
(0.0680) (0.0700) (0.0737)
Industry tariff * large -0.0651 -0.0503 -0.0396
(0.0604) (0.0767) (0.0704)
Observations 3,788 3,118 12,195
R-squared 0.792 0.803 0.762
Fixed effects; size based on initial expenses
Industry tariff 0.103 0.141** 0.157***
(0.0730) (0.0648) (0.0440)
Industry tariff * medium -0.0541 -0.0854 -0.0526
(0.0949) (0.105) (0.0870)
Industry tariff * large -0.0187 -0.0833 -0.0322
(0.107) (0.103) (0.0532)
Observations 3,750 3,096 11,885
R-squared 0.793 0.805 0.764
Fixed effects IV; size based on initial revenue
Industry tariff 0.125* 0.159** 0.215***
(0.0706) (0.0688) (0.0492)
Industry tariff * medium -0.0963 -0.123 -0.138
(0.135) (0.151) (0.130)
Industry tariff * large -0.0134 -0.0826 -0.0819
(0.0915) (0.0898) (0.0522)
Observations 3,708 3,056 11,818
R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.019
Endogenous regressor
F-statistic of excluded instruments
Industry tariff * medium 60.61 52.42 40.03
Industry tariff * large 177.8 130.8 72.44
2004*medium 235.4 1235 386.6
2004*large 156.9 247.9 46.73
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The industry tariff is based on the 2002 industry of the business as is the sample selection by industry. 
All regressions also include year fixed effects, year effects interacted with household business size 
indicator, industry fixed effects, province fixed effects and controls for household business 
characteristics. These include an indicator for w hether a household business is in an urban area, gender, 
age, and education of the manager, an indicator for w hether a m anager is an ethnic minority, household 
size, and variables denoting gender and age com position of household members. The latter include 
variables that indicate the num ber of fam ily m em bers ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and older by 
gender.
Table 10a: Exit heterogeneity regression results
Dependent variable is an indicator for exiting between 2002 and 2004
(1)
Traded industries
(2)
Manufacturing
industries
(3)
All industries
Size based on initial revenue
Change in industry tariff 0.120 0.0289 -0.138
(0.124) (0.160) (0.101)
Change in industry tariff * medium 0.0161 0.0173 0.00482
(0.0552) (0.0503) (0.0485)
Change in industry tariff * large -0.107 -0.232 0.0357
(0.146) (0.145) (0.132)
Observations 3,617 2,846 10,588
R-squared 0.120 0.140 0.089
Size based on initial expenses
Change in industry tariff 0.0938 0.0213 -0.202**
(0.109) (0.141) (0.0902)
Change in industry tariff * medium -0.0617 -0.109 0.0715
(0.0924) (0.0640) (0.0688)
Change in industry tariff * large -0.00824 -0.115 0.189
(0.125) (0.114) (0.120)
Observations 3,537 2,807 10,199
R-squared 0.115 0.141 0.076
IV; size based on initial revenue
Change in industry tariff 0.127 0.00719 -0.191**
(0.112) (0.112) (0.0869)
Change in industry tariff * medium -0.0579 0.0360 0.0118
(0.202) (0.135) (0.143)
Change in industry tariff * large 0.0137 -0.0595 0.193*
(0.119) (0.104) (0.107)
Observations 3,537 2,807 10,199
R-squared 0.112 0.137 0.081
F-statistic of excluded instruments
Endogenous regressor
Industry tariff * medium 50.75 89.81 35.91
Industry tariff * large 276.4 350.8 194.6
2004*medium 321.5 1339 591.0
2004*large 47.10 281.2 28.53
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
industry tariff is based on the 2002 industry of the business as is the sample selection by industry. All 
regressions also include year fixed effects, year effects interacted with household business size indicator, 
industry fixed effects, province fixed effects and controls for household business characteristics. These  
include an indicator for w hether a household business is in an urban area, gender, age, and education of 
the manager, an indicator for w hether a m anager is an ethnic minority, household size, and variables 
denoting gender and age com position of household members. The latter include variables that indicate the 
num ber of fam ily members ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and older by gender.
Table 10b: Exit heterogeneity regression results
Dependent variable is an indicator for exiting between 2002 and 2004
(1) (2) (3) 
Manufacturing
Traded industries industries All industries
Change in industry tariff 0.284
Size based on initial revenue
0.215 -0.0519
(0.174) (0.195) (0.151)
Change in industry tariff * medium -0.237 -0.292* -0.0879
(0.155) (0.161) (0.147)
Change in industry tariff * large -0.314 -0.553*** 0.0585
(0.229) (0.171) (0.219)
Observations 3,617 2,846 10,588
R-squared 0.105 0.123 0.078
Change in industry tariff 0.183
Size based on initial expenses
0.182 -0.307
(0.224) (0.255) (0.195)
Change in industry tariff * medium -0.148 -0.291 0.191
(0.187) (0.188) (0.176)
Change in industry tariff * large -0.247 -0.513*** 0.298
(0.238) (0.177) (0.238)
Observations 3,537 2,807 10,199
R-squared 0.097 0.121 0.065
Change in industry tariff
1
0.214
IV; size based on initial revenue
0.255 -0.241
(0.344) (0.365) (0.272)
Change in industry tariff * medium -0.135 -0.287 0.124
(0.338) (0.340) (0.262)
Change in industry tariff * large -0.188 -0.506** 0.289
(0.280) (0.225) (0.271)
Observations 3,537 2,807 10,199
R-squared 0.101 0.122 0.072
F-statistic of excluded instruments
Endogenous regressor
Industry tariff * medium 227.8 323.0 137.8
Industry tariff * large 240.5 197.9 303.4
2004*medium 158.5 482.9 180.1
2004*large 120.6 568.5 63.62
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Clustered by industry *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
industry tariff is based on the 2002 industry of the business as is the sample selection by industry. All 
regressions also include year fixed effects, year effects interacted with household business size indicator, 
industry fixed effects, province fixed effects and controls for household business characteristics. These  
include an indicator for w hether a household business is in an urban area, gender, age, and education of 
the manager, an indicator for w hether a m anager is an ethnic minority, household size, and variables 
denoting gender and age com position of household members. The latter include variables that indicate the 
num ber of fam ily members ages 0-14, ages 15-60, and ages 61 and older by gender.
Table A1 - Summary of how the manager was predicted for 2004 businesses
How  m anager prediction w as m ade
# of
businesses in 
2004
share of 
businesses in 
2004
Share of 
correct 
predictions 
in 2006
Only household m em ber matched by industry to the business 14701 0.705 0.993
Only household m em ber with m atching years, months, and days per month 384 0.018 0.918
Only household m em ber matched by industry to the business 31 0.001 0.912
Only household m em ber with m atching m onths and days per month 1979 0.095 0.802
Only household m em ber matched by industry to the business 44 0.002 0.833
Only household m em ber with m atching months 250 0.012 0.749
Only household m em ber matched by industry to the business 4 0.000 0.667
W orked most years out of m atched household m em bers 1026 0.049 0.751
W orked most days out of m atched household m em bers 307 0.015 0.663
W orked most hours per day out of matched household m em bers 556 0.027 0.685
Only head or spouse w orking in the business 175 0.008 0.852
Head w orking in the business 1108 0.053 0.691
Highest ranked child w orking in the business 278 0.013 0.710
Highest ranked individual w orking in the business 16 0.001 0.875
Highest ranked individual-job w orking in the business 4 0.000 0.000
Total 20863 1.000 0.924
______ Number of businesses operated by the household in 2004
Table A2 - Number of households by number of businesses run in 2002 and 2004
Number of 
businesses 
operated by 
the household 
in 2002
0 1 2 3 4 Total
0 11801 1960 171 6 1 13939
1 1934 3932 645 74 7 6592
2 205 712 629 94 8 1648
3 12 53 102 32 6 205
4 1 12 10 6 2 31
Total 13953 6669 1557 212 24 22415
Table A3 - Number of businesses by method of matching
Number of 
businesses ...
Share of 
businesses .
... that can potentially be matched 7261 1.000
... matched by industry and manager 3821 0.526
... only matched by industry 1272 0.175
... only matched by manager 1038 0.143
... unmatched by industry or manager 1130 0.156
